Abstract:
Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quantifies its own contribution (to a public good, for example), before the set of pledges must beaccepted. I first show that, if the tolerance for delay is uncertain, each equilibrium pledge coincides with an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The weights placed on others payoffs reflect the underlying uncertainty, but they vary from pledge to pledge, so the set of equilibrium pledges is inefficient. This bargaining outcome is embedded in a dynamic contribution game, with endogenous technology, participation, enforcement, and contract terms, to investigate when pledge-and-review bargaining is desirable. The models predictions can rationalize the key differences between the climate agreements signed in Kyoto (1997) and Paris (2015) as well as the development from the former to the latter.
Sammendrag:
Denne artikkelen utvikler og analyserer en spill-teoretisk forhandlingssituasjon inspirert av klimaavtalen i Paris, 2015. Det spesielle i dette spillet er at hver part foreslår hvor mye de skal kutte, isteden for å foreslå en fullstendig avtale (slik det vanligvis antas i forhandlingsteori). Forhandlingsløsningen karakteriseres og settes inn i et dynamisk spill der hvert land har utslipp og investeringer i teknologi over tid. Analysen kan brukes til å sammenligne Parisavtalen og Kyoto protokollen, og resultatene kan forklare flere av forskjellene mellom de to avtalene.
*"Pledge-and-review bargaining" er et konsept som brukes i forhandlingene. Det lar seg vanskelig oversette.