Oppdragsgivers prosjektnr.:
Frisch prosjekt: 4101 - Economics of health
Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation
Link to article:
Authors:
Asheim, G., A.W. Emblem and T. Nilssen
Year:
2001
Reference:
HERO Skrifter
Number in series: 1
Summary
In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy af-fects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a high-ability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and is only partly insured.
JEL:
I11, G22, D81
Project:
Oppdragsgiver: Norges forskningsrådOppdragsgivers prosjektnr.:
Frisch prosjekt: 4101 - Economics of health
ISBN:
82-7756-045-1
Contact:
anne.w.emblem@hia.no
