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Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation

Link to article:

[PDF]

Authors:

Brekke, Kjell Arne, Karen E. Hauge, Jo Thori Lind og Karine Nyborg

Year:

2009

Reference:

Memorandum
Number in series: 8

Summary

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start o high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a xed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.

JEL:

D11, D12, D64, H41

Keywords:

Altruism; conditional cooperation; self-selection

Project:

Oppdragsgiver: Norges forskningsråd
Oppdragsgivers prosjektnr.:
Frisch prosjekt: 3134 - Self-image and sustainability