Genetic testing and repulsion from chance
Link to article:
Authors:
Hoel, Micheal, Tor Iversen, Tore Nilssen and Jon Vislie
Year:
2002
Reference:
HERO Skrifter
Number in series: 10
Summary
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyse this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person’s well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in the future in a way that varies among individuals. We show that both tested high-risks and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates nonverifiability in an ex-ante sense.
JEL:
I11, D82, I18
Project:
Oppdragsgiver: Norges forskningsrådOppdragsgivers prosjektnr.:
Frisch prosjekt: 4101 - Economics of health
ISBN:
82-7756-090-7
Financing:
Research Council of Norway through HERO – Health Economic Research Programme at the University of Oslo.
