The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior
Link to article:
Authors:
Nyborg, K. and M. Rege
Year:
2000
Reference:
Andre skrifter
Discussion paper 279, Oslo, Statistics Norway
Summary
This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate gives smokers a higher social approval from non-smokers, but imposes an inconvenience cost. A non-smoker's disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used he is to being exposed to passive smoking. The analysis shows that introduction of a smoking regulation may move the society from an initial no-consideration Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in which every smoker is considerate, even in the unregulated zone. This crowding in of considerate behavior will prevail even after policy reversal. Empirical evidence confirms that a shift in social norms on considerate smoking has taken place in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.
JEL:
C72, D11, I18
Keywords:
Passive smoking, regulation, social norms, evolutionary game theory
Project:
Oppdragsgiver:Oppdragsgivers prosjektnr.:
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Contact:
karine.nyborg@frisch.uio.no
